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1 Introduction
It has been claimed that if statistical power and p-values are both used to
measure the strength of our evidence for the null-hypothesis when the re-
sults of our tests are not significant, then they can also be used to derive
inconsistent epistemic judgements as we compare two different experi-
ments. Those problematic derivations are known as power approach para-
doxes. The consensus is that we can avoid them if we abandon the idea
that statistical power can measure the strength of our evidence (Hoenig
and Heisey 2001; Machery 2012). In this paper however, I put forward a
different solution. I argue that every power approach paradox rests on an
equivocation on ”strong evidence”.
The main idea is that we need to make a careful distinction between (i)
the evidence provided by the quality of the test and (ii) the evidence pro-
vided by the outcome of the test. Both provide different types of evidence
and their respective strength are to be evaluated differently.
Without loss of generality1, I analyse only one power approach para-
dox in order to reach this conclusion. But first, I set-up the frequentist
framework within which we can find such a paradox.
1My analysis is without loss of generality because every other formulation of the para-
dox rests on the same idea that I reject : power and p-values measure the same thing.
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2 The Paradox
2.1 Technical Background
A statistical test contrasts two mutually exclusive propositions: H0 (the
null hypothesis) and H1 (the alternative hypothesis). It also requires a
decision rule. The decision rule states that if the probability of making
observations as extreme or more extreme than the ones we have made is
too low under the assumption that H0 is true, then we should reject H0
and thus accept H1 (significant result). If it is not too low, then we should
not reject H0 (non-significant result).
That probability is called ”the p-value”. What ”extreme” means de-
pends on the probability distributions that are specified by H0 and H1.
What ”too low” means is relatively arbitrary. It is determined by the in-
vestigators and it is usually smaller than or equal to 0.01 or 0.05 depending
on the field of study. That value is called ”the significance level” (”α” for
short) and it is also the probability (or the upper bound probability) of
making a type I error if the null hypothesis is true. A type I error is the
rejection of H0 when in fact H0 is true. A type II error, on the other hand,
is the failure to reject H0 when H1 is true. If H1 is true, the probability of
committing this kind of error is called ”β”.
Hypotheses are either simple or composite. They are simple only if
every parameter involved is specified. If not, then the hypothesis is said
to be composite. In fact, we can think of a composite hypothesis as a set
of simple hypotheses. This distinction is important because it implies that
we do not know the exact probability distribution of our observations un-
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der a composite hypothesis. Therefore, we cannot always know the exact
probability of making a type I or a type II error.
If H0 is composite, then we define our test in such a way that the prob-
ability of making a type I error is at most equal to the significance level2.
In other words, we assume that the type I error is equal to the significance
level even though it could in fact be smaller. On the other hand, if H1 is
composite, then we only know that β is a function of the unspecified pa-
rameters. As we shall see, this has an important impact on the epistemic
interpretation of a statistical test.
To give an example of a decision rule, here is one for a unilateral test
with α = 0.05 and where PH0(test statistic ≥ observed test statistic) is the
p-value:
• If PH0(test statistic ≥ observed test statistic) ≤ 0.05, reject H0 and
accept H1.
• If PH0(test statistic ≥ observed test statistic) ≤ 0.05, do not reject H0.
2.2 Epistemic Interpretations
Now, the epistemic significance of α and β should be obvious. Since we
wish to avoid making mistakes, then, ceteris paribus, we will prefer to per-
form a test such that α has the smallest value and 1− β (the power of a
test, ”pi” for short), the largest. But there is more. We can also use α and pi
to measure of the strength of our evidence.
2That is one of the reason why α can be an upper bound probability of making a type
I error when H0 is true.
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If the ratio piα is greater than 1, then we know that a significant result
is more likely under H1 than H0. Therefore, we know that a significant
result provides evidence for H1. Moreover, we can measure the strength
of that evidence against H0 with that ratio. The greater the difference of
that ratio with 1, the stronger is our evidence against H0.
Similarly, if the ratio (1−α)
(1−pi) is greater than 1, then we know that a non-
significant result is more likely under H0 than under H1. Thus, we know
that a non-significant result provides evidence against H1. We can also
measure the strength of our evidence against H1 with that ratio. The
greater the difference of that ratio with 1, the stronger is our evidence
against H1.
In many cases however, it is not possible to use such ratios because the
power of our test can be too small. For example, when we use a t-test in
order to tell if the theoretical means of two variables that can be measured
in two different groups are significantly different (H0: µ1 = µ2 VS H1:
µ1 6= µ2), we simply cannot conclude that H1 is false given that our test is
non-significant. The reason why we cannot do such a thing is that the dif-
ference between the two means can be infinitely close to zero such that the
power of that test can be very small. As mentioned earlier, when we are
facing a composite alternative, β (and pi) is a function of the unspecified
values of the parameters involved in H1.
But there is always a way around this kind of problem. In practice,
we would not be interested in the exact equality between µ1 and µ2. We
would be interested in trying to establish if there is a negligible or trivial
difference between them. We could therefore specify the magnitude of
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that negligible difference and ignore the fact that the power of our test
could, in principle, be very small. In other words, we could interpret a
non-significant result as evidence that the difference between µ1 and µ2 is
negligible (i.e., that H0 is approximately true) if we know that our test was
powerful enough to detect a greater difference.
Thus, it seems quite reasonable to say that the strength of our evidence
can be measured by the significance level of our test and its power. But
p-values also seem to have a similar epistemic function. A p-value gives us
the smallest α that would have yielded a significant result.
This means two things. Firstly, if the test is significant, then we know
how much the measure of pi/α can be increased by decreasing α in order to
assess positively the strength of the evidence against H0. Secondly, if the
test is not significant, then we can know how much the measure (1−α)
(1−pi) can
be increased by decreasing 1− α in order to assess positively the strength
of the evidence for H0.
In other words, it looks like our evidence against H0 can be stronger
than we would have thought a priori the smaller the p-value. Likewise,
if the idea of accepting H0 (rejecting H1) makes sense (i.e. if our test is
powerful enough and if we are in a position to know that it is), it appears
that our evidence against H1 can be stronger than we would have thought
a priori the larger the p-value.
2.3 A Paradox
However, as soon as we reach this conclusion, we need to grapple with
puzzling epistemic paradoxes. To see this, let us consider two different
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t-tests.
As mentioned before, a t-test can be used when we wish to tell if the
theoretical means of a variable that can be measured in two different groups
are significantly different (H0: µ1 = µ2 VS H1: µ1µ2). For example, it could
be used to tell if the expected diameter of a doughnut produced by shop is
significantly different from the expected size of a doughnut produced by
another shop of the same branch (a bilateral test). To conduct this experi-
ment, we would need to take two samples of doughnuts from each shop
and make a few assumptions in order to establish the probability density
function of our t-statistic under H0. Then, we would need to estimate the
mean and the variance of each group and obtain a t-statistic (our observa-
tion).
Now consider two such experiments: E1 and E2. Each focuses on a
different pair of doughnut shops. Imagine also that we are ready to admit
that H0 is basically correct if the difference is no greater than 1mm and that
we can tell if our test is powerful enough to be able to detect a difference
that is greater than 1mm.
Suppose that the resulting tests yield non-significant results, yet the p-
value in E1 is smaller (p1 < p2) and the power of E1 is greater (pi2 < pi1).
Therefore, if our evidence against H1 is stronger the greater the power (see
previous ratios) and if our evidence against H1 is weaker the smaller the
p-value, then we are led to admit that E1 provides the strongest evidence
against H1 (for H0) and the weakest evidence against H1 (for H0). Hence,
we have on our hands what is now known as a power approach paradox.
The recipe for such paradoxes is quite simple. First, we define two sta-
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tistical tests, T1 and T2, such that the former is more powerful than the
latter. Then we assume that they both yield non-significant results and
stipulate that the p-value associated with T1 is smaller than the p-value
associated with T2. Consequently, we can use the epistemic interpretation
of the statistical power and the p-value in order to reach paradoxical con-
clusions such as ”The result of T1 provides more evidence for H0 (against
H1) and less evidence for H0 (against H1) than the result of T2”. The para-
dox presented in this section and the ones we can find in (Hoenig Heisey
2001) and in (Machery 2012) follow exactly this recipe.
3 The Consensus
The main solution to this problem is to abandon the idea that the power
of a test can measure the strength of the evidence. We can abandon this
idea either because we believe that the power of a test cannot justify the
acceptance of H0, or because we believe that it is an inappropriate measure
even though it can be used to justify the acceptance of H0. John Hoenig
and Dennis Heisey endorse the former belief, whereas Edouard Machery
endorses the latter.
In their article, Hoenig and Heisey do not voice any objection against
the epistemic interpretation of the p-value as a measure of the strength of
the evidence against H0. However, they maintain that a non-significant
result does not allow us to infer H0 and that the strength of the evidence
cannot be measured with the power of the test. If we use the power of a
test to make such an inference, we end up with a power approach paradox
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end of discussion.
Edouard Machery, on the other hand, believes that the power of a test
can only determine if we should accept H0 or not:
one can assume that the power of an experiment is a property
of a test that allows for the application of a decision rule spec-
ifying when the null hypothesis is to be accepted and the al-
ternative hypothesis rejected: accept the null hypothesis from
a negative result when and only when power is above some
threshold (Machery 2012, p.816).
However, he claims that the power of a test does not measure anything.
This obviously solves the paradox presented in section 2, because such an
interpretation would prevent us from saying that E1 provides the strongest
evidence against H1.
Machery would also claim that it is a mistake to say that E1 provides
the weakest evidence against H1 because he believes that a p-value, just
like the power of a test, does not measure anything. It merely determines
if we should reject H0 or not:
a p-value is a property of the data that allows for the appli-
cation of a decision rule specifying when the null hypothesis
is to be rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted [...].
Under this interpretation, p-values are not taken to measure
the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis (Machery
2012, p.816).
In the following section, I put forward a very different solution to the
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power approach paradox. I maintain that the power of a test and the p-
value can measure the strength of our evidence and argue that power ap-
proach paradoxes rest on an equivocation on ”strong evidence” (the equiv-
ocation is on the notion of evidence). I show that the paradoxes dissolve
when we cash-out the meaning of ”strong evidence” adequately and in-
terpret p-values, significance levels, and statistical power accordingly.
4 The Solution
As a matter of fact, it is relatively easy to create paradoxes that are very
similar to power approach paradoxes. Here is an example. A police officer
stops a driver on the side of the road. She suspects that the individual is
driving under the influence of alcohol. Luckily, she has at her disposition
two different instruments to measure blood alcohol concentration. Lets
call them ”instrument A” and ”instrument B”. Instrument A is fairly reli-
able but instrument B is not. Now suppose that we know that our reflexes
are more likely to be dangerously impaired if our blood alcohol content is
above 0.05 mg/ml. On that occasion, instrument A produces a reading of
0.052 and instrument B produces a reading of 0.07.
Because instrument A is more reliable, the officer ought to believe that
it provides the strongest evidence for the claim that the drivers faculties
are dangerously impaired. Yet, because As reading is closer to the thresh-
old, she also ought to believe that it provides the weakest evidence for the
same claim. Clearly, something does not sound right. We are facing yet
another paradox.
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In this case, this is because we are not in fact comparing the same
things. On the one hand, when we claim that instrument A provides the
strongest evidence because it is more reliable, we are comparing the cred-
ibility of the support provided by the output of the instruments. On the
other hand, when we claim that instrument A provides the weakest ev-
idence, we are in fact trying to compare the degree to which the instru-
ments outputs support the hypothesis. To do this adequately, we would
in fact need to make a counterfactual statement such as ”Were instrument
B as reliable or more reliable than instrument A, it would have provided
more support for the hypothesis”.
As we can see, there is nothing paradoxical in making both compar-
ative judgments. The paradox rests on an equivocation on ”strong evi-
dence”. There is an important distinction to make between the credibility
of the support given by the output of an instrument and the degree to
which this output supports the hypothesis. One way to distinguish both
concepts is to realise that the credibility of the support does not depend on
the actual output of the instrument whereas the degree of support does.
In what follows, I will argue that the power approach paradox described
in section 2 also rests on the same kind of equivocation and thoroughly
deconstruct the misleading chain of reasoning that was presented there.
The degree of support given by the quality of a statistical test is differ-
ent from the degree of support given by the output of that test. Both can
be evaluated for their strength as I have explained in section 2.2. When we
are considering the result of a statistical test as evidence that a hypothesis
is true, we must evaluate the quality of the test with the ratios presented
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in section 2.2.
pi/α and (1−α)
(1−pi) can be interpreted as providing measures of the quality
of the test because they are features of the decision procedure. Those val-
ues do not depend on the actual outcome of the experiment. They deter-
mine how the evidence is produced. As such, when we say that a test with
more power provides stronger evidence against H1, we ought to mean that
it provides more credible support against H1.
The magnitude of a p-value on the other hand is determined by the
experimental outcome and it can be interpreted as providing a measure of
the degree to which the output supports a hypothesis a posteriori. Hence,
when we say that a test with a smaller p-value would have provided
stronger evidence for H1, we ought to mean that the evidence would have
provided more support for H1. The credibility of the support is not under
scrutiny in this context. The degree of a posteriori support is.
Now we can understand why the chain of reasoning that led to the
power approach paradox in section 2 was misleading. Firstly, the claim
that the evidence against H1 was stronger in E1 because pi2 < pi1, meant
that the the support against H1 was more credible because the quality of
the test was stronger.
Secondly, the claim that the evidence against H1 was weaker in E1 be-
cause p1 < p2, meant that the information given by p1 was less support-
ive of H0 than the information given by p2. It was the degree of support
given by the p-values that was being compared. The idea that was being
conveyed was that ratio (1−α)
(1−pi) could not be increased as much within the
context of E1 as it could be within the context of E2. As such, both claims
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are not in conflict. Thus, the paradox rests on an equivocation. Once we
make the appropriate distinctions, similar paradoxes dissolve.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that power approach paradoxes dissolve when
we cash-out the meaning of ”strong evidence” adequately and interpret
p-values, significance levels, and statistical power accordingly. Clearly,
Hoenig, Heisey and Machery failed to do so.
The quality of the evidence is provided by i) the quality of the test and
ii) the output of the test. I have claimed that the quality of the test can be
measured by the following ratios: pi/α and (1−α)
(1−pi) . I have also claimed that
the support provided by the p-value (the output of the test) can be measure
by how much we can improve the measures provided by those ratios a
posteriori. What we have here is thus a coherent epistemic interpretation
of a statistical test that is free of power approach paradoxes.
I would now like to conclude by saying that the power approach para-
dox is a problem within the frequentist framework. As such, I have put
forward a solution within that framework. Whether or not the frequentist
approach can withstand other criticisms is a different story. However, if
the frequentist approach turns out to be epistemically unsound, it is not
because of the power approach paradox.
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